Abstract-The emerging traffic demand has triggered an impressive deployment of network infrastructure, including macro Base Stations (BSs) and Small Cells (SCs), leading to increased energy consumption and expenditures. However, the network underutilization during low traffic periods (e.g., night zone) enables the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) to save energy by having their traffic served by third-party SCs, thus being able to switch off their BSs. In this paper, we propose a novel market approach to foster the opportunistic utilization of unexploited SCs capacity, where the MNOs lease the resources of third-party SCs and deactivate their BSs. Motivated by the conflicting interests of the MNOs and the restricted capacity of the SCs that is not adequate to carry the whole traffic in multi-operator scenarios, we introduce a combinatorial auction framework, which includes: i) a bidding strategy, ii) a resource allocation scheme, and iii) a pricing rule. We propose a multiobjective framework to provide an energy efficient solution for the resource allocation problem and we provide extensive analytical and experimental results to estimate the potential energy savings.
I. INTRODUCTION
In current networks, data demand is facing an explosive increase and is expected to grow at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 57% from 2014 to 2019 [1] . To meet these demands, the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) deploy a large number of Base Stations (BSs), while they may also lease bandwidth from third-parties that deploy Small Cell (SC) networks in areas with high peak traffic [2] . However, the dense Heterogeneous Networks (HetNets) imply higher energy consumption and, especially during night, this energy is spent inefficiently, since the traffic is low and both the BSs and the SCs are underutilized. To that end, the research community has recently shifted towards the investigation of BS switching off schemes [3] - [5] , examining either single-operator HetNets, or multi-operator networks with macro BSs only.
Works that combine HetNets and multiple operators focus on traffic offloading from BSs to SCs during peak utilization [6] - [8] without considering any switching off strategy. However, the SCs are used during the day for traffic offloading, but they are most likely to remain underutilized during night. Even when their traffic is low, the BSs consume considerable energy, compared to the low-powered SCs. Hence, to achieve drastic energy savings, the opportunistic exploitation of the unused SCs and the deactivation of the redundant BSs during low traffic conditions is a very promising solution. A switching off solution through offloading is investigated in [9] . The authors propose an auction-based resource allocation scheme, where the operators submit a bidding value for the capacity resources. Nonetheless, a particular network configuration is considered, where it is assumed that the SC capacity is sufficient to serve the whole network traffic, allowing the switching off of all the BS infrastructure. In real life scenarios, however, the SCs are not always able to fully support the network traffic, especially when numerous MNOs are present in the same area [10] .
In this paper, we propose a switching off mechanism via offloading, where the MNOs lease the SC capacity and switch off their BSs. Under low traffic conditions, each MNO is willing to offload its whole traffic to switch off its BS and maximize its energy efficiency. Since the SCs capacity is limited, our proposal considers the diverse predilections of each MNO. In contrast, the third-party wants to maximize its income by leasing its capacity to the MNOs, a goal that may contradict the MNOs' tendency to save energy. Thus, auction theory is employed and the contributions are given below: 1) We propose an auction scheme that enables the efficient usage of SCs resources under low traffic. The mechanism is designed to provide the optimal solution that maximizes the third-party's income and minimizes the energy consumption at the same time. 2) We design a Markov-based analytical model that theoretically estimates the throughput and the energy efficiency for the individual MNOs and the network. 3) We validate the theoretical analysis and assess the effectiveness of the proposed auction-based switching off scheme. The results indicate the potential total energy efficiency gains in the network.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The system model is described in Section II. In Section III, we introduce the auction-based optimization approach, used for the BSs switching off decision. The analytical models for throughput and energy efficiency are given in Section IV. The validation of the models along with the simulation results are provided in Section V and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL Our system model, consists of an area served by N collocated macro BSs and M SCs [11] . We assume that the N BSs are owned by N different MNOs, who provide coverage through their BSs, denoted by BS n , with n ∈ N = {1, . . . , N } characterizing the MNO. The M third-party SCs (SC m , m ∈ M = {1, . . . , M }) are uniformly distributed within the macro cell, assuming that the number of SCs is adequate to cover the service area of a BS [2] .
For the traffic, we assume the traffic given in [12] . We focus on the night, when the aggregated traffic per BS is relatively low (i.e., less than 25 Mbps, which corresponds to 22% of the cell's capacity, CR BS . For the sake of generality, we assume that the traffic volumes of different MNOs may be different, following the same pattern.
III. AUCTION FOR BSS SWITCHING OFF
In this section, we give an overview of the proposed framework. We present the combinatorial auction to select the MNOs that can offload all their traffic to the SCs, thus being able to switch off their BSs. We provide the bidding strategy and we formulate the Integer Linear Programming (ILP) model which provides the optimal allocation and the switching off strategy. To ensure truthful bidding, the VickreyClarke-Grooves (VCG) mechanism [13] is employed.
A. The Big Picture
By considering the limited capacity of the SCs and the MNOs' motivation to switch off their BSs, we use an auctionbased mechanism to motivate the operators to offload the traffic to the third-party network. The MNOs act as the buyers, who are willing to lease the SCs resources and offload their traffic. The third-party, acting as the seller, collects the bids and, through an auction, selects the subset of MNOs that can offload their traffic. The auction consists of three main steps: bidding, allocation and pricing. In the bidding phase, the MNOs place their bids. In the allocation step, the third-party decides which bidders are the winners and, in the pricing step, each winner's payment price is settled. The winning MNOs offload their traffic to the SCs and switch off their BSs, while the losing bidders keep their BSs active.
B. Bidding Strategy
Each SC m of the third-party (seller) is willing to lease its capacity resources CR SC to the MNOs. Moreover, each MNO n ∈ N wants to lease specific resources CR n,m from SC m to offload their traffic. The MNOs valuate the capacity resources at a given price u n,m , unknown to the third-party and the other bidders. According to the auction theory, each operator submits the bid pair B n,m = (b n,m , CR n,m ), representing the price, b n,m ≤ u n,m , that the MNO n is willing to pay for leasing the capacity CR n,m from SC m .
C. Auction Formulation
By employing the properties of combinatorial auction theory, we formulate the problem of the opportunistic offloading as an auction. Each MNO n ∈ N places the corresponding bid pair, B n,m . Having received the bids, the third-party selects the subset of MNOs that maximizes the desired goals.
Let us define the binary variable x n,m as a binary decision variable that indicates whether the corresponding bidder (MNO n) is winner (x n,m = 1) or not (x n,m = 0) in the corresponding SC m . Two objectives are considered: 1) Maximization of the third-party income. The thirdparty allocates its available resources to the MNOs that offer the highest bids, so as to compensate for the SCs operation costs and its financial gain, G, is:
where C SC is the SC cost, corresponding to the sum of its CapEx and OpEx. For the calculation of the SCs cost, the cost model presented in [11] is employed. 2) Minimization of the energy consumption. As the macro BSs consume the major part of the network energy [11] , the minimization of the consumed energy is attained by reducing the number of active BSs. We define the network energy consumption, E[E], as:
while E[E BSn ] and E[E SC ] represent the BS and SC energy consumption, respectively. An operator is able to switch off its BS, if it wins in all the auctions, a condition that is represented by the product in Eq. (3). The product is equal to 1 when the nth MNO wins in all the M auctions, otherwise it is 0.
The two objectives are contradictive, since the maximization of the third-party income does not imply the BSs switching off, whereas the second objective does not ensure the thirdparty's interests. In order to capture this tradeoff, multiobjective optimization is employed [13] . The ILP multiobjective optimization problem, namely P1, is formulated as follows:
The objective function (4) aims at maximizing the financial gain of the third-party and minimizing the network energy consumption. Constraint in Eq. (5) ensures that the total number of allocated resources does not exceed its availability and constraint (6) ensures the integrality of the binary variable.
The multiobjective problem P1 has high complexity to resolve. To overcome this problem, the second objective of the problem, shown in Eq. (2) is transformed into a constraint of a single-objective optimization problem [13] . The product in Eq. (3) represents the condition of whether an operator wins in all the auctions or not. Thus, the problem is transformed into a simpler formulation in Eq. (7) and, at the same time, the energy consumption objective is not neglected, in contrast to former works [9] , where only the maximization of the thirdparty's income is considered.
s.t.
n∈N m∈M
x n,m ∈ {0, 1}, ∀n ∈ N , ∀m ∈ M.
The objective function (7) aims at maximizing the financial gain of the third-party. Constraint (8) assures that an operator wins in all the M auctions (and switches off its BS) or loses in all the auctions (keeps its BS active). Thus, this constraint assures the minimization of the energy consumption given by the Eq. (2), since the third-party achieves the maximization of its income, by selecting the resource allocation that also lead to the highest number of switched off BSs (assuring that at least one operator switches off its BS). Constraints (9) and (10) are the same as constraints (5) and (6), respectively.
D. Pricing Strategy
The VCG payment induces all the users to reveal their actual valuations for the requested bandwidth. The third-party charges the bidders (MNOs) with a price so as to compensate for the requested capacity of the different bidders. For example, an MNO who requires large bandwidth will have to pay a high price, since its request results in dissatisfying other MNOs who lose in the auction due to the limited capacity resources.
Let us denote by p n,m the price paid by the nth MNO to the third-party for the allocated capacity of the mth SC. Thus,
The payment rule for each MNO i ∈ N can be formally defined as follows: Based on the VGC auction, it holds that b n,m = u n,m , thus assuring the truthfulness and individual rationality of the payment rule.
IV. ANALYTICAL MODELS
In this section, we provide the analytical models for the calculation of the network throughput and energy efficiency, when the auction-based switching off algorithm is applied.
The traffic consists of data traffic with constant bit rate R. We assume that, for each node k (BS n or SC m ) 1 , data sessions are Poisson processes with rate λ (k) and exponential service time 1/µ (k) . Hence, we model the operation of the node k as a Markov chain. Each state of the system is characterized by the number of active data sessions, denoted by d. The maximum number of simultaneously served data sessions is D BS = CR BS /R and D SC = CR SC /R for the BSs and the SCs, respectively, given that CR BS and CR SC refer to the BS and SC bandwidth, respectively. By defining D = {D BS , D SC }, the balance equation is:
where p
represents the state probability that the node k remains idle, calculated as:
1 We assume that k corresponds to a BSn or a SCm. Thus, k = {BSn, SCm}.
A. Throughput
The expected throughput E [T BSn ], E [T SCm ], for the BS n and SC m , respectively, is calculated as the average number (over all possible states of the system) of served sessions in the system multiplied by the transmission rate:
, and (15)
, and p
are the steady state probabilities for the given traffic load rate λ (BSn) , and λ (SCm) , respectively.
In continuation, we calculate the throughput for the network of N MNOs and the M SCs, after the application of the algorithm. We define as λ ′ (SCm) = i∈N OF F λ (i) , with N OF F ⊆ N , the subset of operators that switch off their BSs, the new average traffic load of the SC m , which is equal to the traffic of the switched off BSs that must be served by SC m . Thus, the total throughput of the network is:
where E T ′ SCm is the average throughput of the mth SC when it serves the traffic λ ′(SCm) .
B. Energy Efficiency
The expected energy efficiency E[η
] of a BS n is defined as the ratio of the average transmitted bits E [B BSn ] over the average energy E [E BSn ]:
The average transmitted bits during the night zone can be calculated by multiplying the average throughput given in Eq. (15) with the duration of the night zone t night :
To calculate the average energy consumption, we should take into account the power consumed by the BS for operation and transmission, consisting of three components: i) the constant power P cnst , consumed by an active BS for operations such as cooling, antenna feeding, etc, ii) the idle power P idle , which is the power consumed when the BS remains idle, i.e., when there are no ongoing traffic sessions, iii) the transmission power for serving the ongoing traffic sessions corresponding to each state p
, considering that P tx denotes the transmission power for serving a single data session. Hence, the average energy consumption during the night zone t night is:
Accordingly, the expected energy efficiency E[η ] for the SC m is defined as:
where the power of a SC, P SC , is slightly dependent on the traffic [11] , in contrast to the power of a BS that is significantly dependent on the traffic load. Thus, a constant value for the SC power is employed.
Finally, the total network energy efficiency is defined as:
, with (24)
SCm , and (25)
where E B
′
SCm and E E ′ SCm are the transmitted bits and the energy consumption of the mth SC, when serving traffic equal to λ
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION We have developed a custom-made C simulator for the network operation to validate the analytical expressions and assess the performance of the proposed auction-based switching off scheme. In this section, we present the simulation setup along with the analytical and experimental results.
A. Simulation Scenario
The simulation scenario includes a cell served by N = 5 MNOs with as many BSs and M = 15 SCs that cover the whole cell area. In our experiments, we assume that the MNOs have different traffic volumes, i.e., ρ n , and we examine two scenarios, where MNOs with high and low traffic coexist. Particularly, in Scenario 1, we consider that part of the MNOs, denoted by N low , have relatively low traffic with ρ n = 0.5, while the remaining operators (i.e., N − N low ) are fully loaded with ρ n = 1.0. In Scenario 2, we consider a more heterogeneous setup in which one MNO has very high traffic (ρ n = 1.9), a number of MNOs, denoted by N low , have very low traffic (ρ n = 0.1), while the remaining operators (i.e., N − N low − 1) have traffic equal to ρ n = 1.0.
To assess the performance of our scheme, we compare the proposed energy efficient auction-based switching off strategy (referred as ESO) to: i) an auction-based switching off scheme, where the income of the third-party is the only objective to be maximized (referred as ISO) [9] , and ii) a baseline scenario, where none of the BSs is switched off (referred as NSO). The simulation parameters are summarized in Table I . Before proceeding to the performance analysis results, let us highlight that ESO and ISO schemes do not experience any losses in terms of lost sessions. The idea behind the resource allocation and the switching off decision is based on the requirement that the whole traffic can be served, since MNOs are motivated to apply an energy efficient algorithm, if and only if the service of their users is guaranteed. 
B. Performance Results
Both the ESO and the ISO schemes maximize the income gains of the third-party, since the outcome of the optimization problems leads to the allocation of the whole capacity of the SCs. In addition, by applying the ESO algorithm, we achieve the energy consumption minimization, as well.
Firstly, we compare our proposal (ESO) to the state-ofthe-art approach (ISO) for the Scenario 1 in terms of the number of switched off BSs ( Fig. 1(a) ) and network energy efficiency ( Fig. 1(b) ). In Fig. 1(a) , we observe that, with our proposal, more BSs are switched off in the majority of the cases. The higher number of deactivated BSs is explained by the second objective that we employ in our algorithm, concerning the minimization of the energy consumption. In ISO, the BSs to be switched off are selected to increase the income of the third-party, without considering the network energy efficiency. Furthermore, in order to gain more insight on the network performance, we have plotted in Fig. 1(b) the average total energy efficiency of the network for the same scenario, comparing our approach to the ISO and NSO algorithms. Our proposal always outperforms the NSO and the ISO and the energy efficiency gains are remarkable reaching up to 337%. Compared to the ISO, our proposal achieves better performance, due to the higher number of switched off BSs.
The performance results for the Scenario 2 are given in terms of the number of switched off BSs (Fig. 2(a) ) and net- work energy efficiency (Fig. 2(b) ). In Fig. 2(a) , ESO achieves again a higher number of switched off BSs compared to ISO. In contrast to Fig. 1(b) , we observe that the difference in the number of switched off BSs between ESO and ISO is even higher because of the higher difference between the traffic load of the MNOs. The ISO scheme gives priority to the MNO with the highest traffic to increase the third-party's income, whereas our approach leads to higher number of switched off BSs, while at the same time achieving significant gains in the third-party's income (all the available SCs resources are leased). Consequently, the energy efficiency gains are even more significant in the Scenario 2, as shown in Fig. 2(b) .
In Fig. 3 , we validate via simulations the analytical models for the throughput and the energy efficiency. The experimental results perfectly match the analysis, thus validating the proposed theoretical expressions. The throughput increases with the traffic load (case: N low = 1 with higher traffic compared to the case: N low = 5), which is a rational conclusion, while, as expected, the network energy efficiency is higher when the network traffic is lower (case: N low = 5 with lower traffic), since fewer users implies higher number of switched off BSs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, motivated by the low BSs utilization during the night and the coexistence of multiple operators and thirdparty SCs in the same area, we proposed a novel auction- based switching off algorithm that achieves energy savings by encouraging MNOs to share the SCs resources and switch off redundant BSs. The proposed scheme has been evaluated in terms of throughput and energy efficiency and the results have shown that our proposal can significantly improve the energy efficiency, comparing to the state-of-the-art approaches, guaranteeing at the same time the throughput in realistic scenarios, motivating the MNOs to adopt our auction-based strategy for their decisions. In our future work, we plan to elaborate on cooperative schemes to investigate the trade offs.
